According to Peter Carlsson the machine purchase was not optimal.
At Norran, we began collecting witness accounts, quickly establishing that the battery factory was plagued with all sorts of problems. What we still couldn't grasp, however, was why so few batteries seemed to be coming out of the factory. They were buying perfectly functional materials from China.
So, where was the problem? We realised we needed to speak with more people in other parts of the factory, digging into both the production process itself and how it was being managed and governed.
Maggie works at the final station for battery cells, and the machines there are constantly malfunctioning. She observes how machines lose cells, how poor welding compromises the batteries' moisture content, and how batteries become contaminated by electrolyte.
Before joining Northvolt, Maggie had many years of experience as an engineer and extensive leadership experience within the industry. She was accustomed to machines undergoing rigorous testing with suppliers, typically needing to meet specific criteria before being shipped to a factory. However, this was not the case with these machines.
– I know this because there are no reports about this being done, she says.
When asked why she thinks this is, she simply shrugs.
– The project deadline had to be met. Perhaps they needed to rush things? But as early as 2023, everyone in the business knew that these machines didn't work. Not just here, but globally.
The transition to large-scale manufacturing proved more difficult than anyone had anticipated, a fact Northvolt's MD Peter Carlsson now acknowledges. He admits they were too hasty in getting the machines they'd ordered from China delivered.
– When Covid came, we were under great time pressure. So when we couldn’t go back and forth to inspect and test in the same way we had planned, we decided to ship the lines anyway, even though they had not been run-through in China. The supplier would then fix the last bits on-site. That was a huge mistake, he says.
As we've previously reported, the machines originate from the Chinese company Wuxi Lead. The main challenge lies in completing the production lines here in Skellefteå. While Wuxi was supposed to send staff for installation support, the ongoing pandemic and China's strict regulations created significant hurdles.
– They didn’t have the support organisation in place to help us, so it took significantly longer to get the lines up to the intended level, Carlsson says.
So, Maggie and her colleagues are struggling as best they can with these problematic machines. But that's not the only issue Maggie sees. She's baffled by the company's approach to recruiting and promoting staff, and how management handles accountability.
There's nothing wrong with the engineers, she explains. They're top-notch and aren't afraid to speak up when something isn't working. The problems, however, lie higher up. Northvolt, in her view, is hiring the wrong "talent" for leadership roles – leaders who simply don't listen. She's barely seen her own boss on the factory floor in the last two years.
– In all the places I’ve worked previously, and when I’ve had leadership roles myself, you’ve been held accountable if things don't work. At Northvolt, it doesn't work like that.
When the most senior boss is invisible on the floor, others end up steering the ship, Maggie observes. In her part of the factory, a young psychologist, recently promoted to project manager, is now in charge. Two other individuals were hired below her, neither with any relevant industry background, but both are married to senior managers. A third person is also set to join their team soon.
– She had worked with children. Came in as a translator and later was promoted project manager. That's how it worked. And people could quickly be elevated through promotions.
Maggie believes that when those meant to oversee the work lack fundamental knowledge and don't understand the core issues, it becomes incredibly difficult to fix problems. It also seems the full picture isn't making its way up the organisational ladder.
– The management presented another picture than the one we saw in production. The top manager in my department should have noticed these problems. And the very top management also has a responsibility to see problems. But they seemed to live in a dream, Maggie says.
Carlsson acknowledges they've had many discussions about strengthening middle management to improve factory operations. He states he's regularly been on the factory floor himself, but also admits it's hard to know what you don't know, suggesting information might not have flowed effectively between management and the production floor.
– Did we make an organisation work perfectly organically? No, we didn’t. It takes time to build this, and there were parts that worked fantastically well and there were other parts that worked less well in this structure.
Peter Carlsson admits that his vision for the business culture has not really worked.
When asked whether they had the right expertise in the right place Carlsson answers that they recruited “a fantastic set of people with many experiences” but that many had never worked in a battery factory but in another industry.
– They also came from different cultures and were used to different hierarchical structures. So it was about working all of this into a structure and that took time.
Ali, working in machine maintenance, grapples with predominantly Chinese equipment that constantly malfunctions. He recounts how Peter Carlsson sometimes visits, moving silently through the factory, observing intently. One day, Carlsson abruptly stopped by a group of chatting employees.
– Hey guys, why are you standing here?
They'd been facing significant issues with electrolyte contamination on the cells, leading to many being destroyed. So far, they'd been polishing off the residue, but the customer no longer wants that. Ali isn't entirely sure why, but they still need to find a new solution to satisfy the customer. Ali had proposed laser treatment for the contaminated cells, but his suggestion was ignored.
– Keep working, Carlsson now says.
Ali is exhausted, his back aches, and his spirits are low. So much isn't functioning correctly, and he struggles to comprehend how management expects anything substantial to come from their grand plans. With his years as an engineer in the oil industry, he learned how to prevent problems.
– There are two types of problems; the predictable and the unpredictable. The latter should not constitute more than 20 percent of all problems; the rest should be kept in check.
But at Ali’s workplace, the numbers are the opposite, he says. The machines and the staff are the major headaches. They recruit inexperienced personnel who quickly climb the ranks. Machine design is flawed, there's no maintenance plan, and only the most urgent issues are addressed. He's even started to wonder if sabotage is involved, given how much is going wrong.
Back at Ali's house, his thoughts continue to race. It's as if the factory is run by an instruction manual on how not to work. It confuses him. And all the values they're supposed to embody at work: being brave and passionate. He is passionate and tries to be brave, but it's as if the words mean nothing anymore.
Because in reality, Northvolt doesn't seem to want brave, passionate people, Ali thinks. They want yes-men who never point out problems, let alone suggest solutions. Or, he wonders, does the problem lie with him?
– I’ve gone to a psychologist to try to understand. Am I a drama queen?
His head keeps spinning. But that’s what happens when people don't communicate properly; one starts to internalise it instead.
Anna Wikner and Ulrika Nohlgren working on the investigation at the Norran office. "We reflected upon how many people we talked to who experienced self-doubts and deep frustration", Ulrika Nohlgren says.
At our office, we've noticed a pattern: many of the individuals we've spoken with, like Ali, begin to doubt themselves after working at Northvolt for a period. They all possess strong professional identities and industry experience, yet few have worked in a battery factory before. Does that matter, we wonder? Is battery manufacturing so uniquely challenging that it makes seasoned professionals question their knowledge and even their sanity? Or is there a systemic way that doubts and complaints are handled?
In the spring and summer of 2024, Josefin Berglund's job involves sending discarded battery cells for recycling. Today, she's inspecting floor markings, wearing a covid mask. This mask, she knows, isn't adequate protection against the chemicals present, but it's the only equipment available.
Josefin Berglund suffered health problems at Northvolt.
It's business as usual, she thinks tiredly; there's no proper safety equipment or protocols. Even when procedures are in place, she feels compelled to double-check that her colleagues are actually following them. Not everyone takes the risks seriously. The hardest part is the frequent lack of clear job descriptions.
Weeks can pass before new instructions arrive because there's always a rush to get started. Sometimes, it gets genuinely dangerous, like the time she had to stop a colleague from washing pallets with poison -- he hadn't even noticed the skull and crossbones on the can.
She's pondering her brother's recent remark: that in a year, the factory sign will likely read Volkswagen or Scania. He might just be right, she muses, given the sheer volume of discarded cells flooding her department. And now, production pace is set to increase again, meaning her department will have even more failed cells to contend with.
Suddenly, she gets a nosebleed out of nowhere. Josefin attributes it to the dry air and continues working. But when she looks in the mirror the next day, her face looks as if she'd been severely beaten, covered in blood.
– Then I started vomiting blood, and it continued like that for four days before it passed. I went to the emergency room twice, but they couldn't say what it was.
Josefin Berglund experienced that nothing changed when she pointed out problem.
She suspects she might have been exposed to electrolyte from contaminated battery cells, as her symptoms and the circumstances align with such exposure. She was later informed that she should have been wearing superior safety equipment.
– Of course, I should've understood that the floor is full of chemicals. But it's not something I thought about then because there weren’t any regulations there.
Josefin files an incident report, but it's dismissed without action. She's grown accustomed to this; she's written more than 20 such reports, none of which have led to any changes.
– They are just dismissed, without consultation with the safety representative. And we rarely saw any actions or changes. I have been told off by my colleagues as well. They thought I shouldn’t write those incident reports. Or as my boss said: ”Keep it in the family”.
The core issue, Josefin states, is an unwillingness to even acknowledge problems. This leads to the same mistakes being repeated constantly, negatively impacting both the work environment and production output.
– There are no problems - and if there are, it’s always the fault of the individual. There's a slogan for the safety work called, "Stop, think and act." But reality doesn't look like that. It’s stress, press, and shut up. And you never stop. The only time production stood still was after the explosion; otherwise, we just keep going.
Norran has previously investigated the work environment in several articles. This is what Matti Kataja said in February 2025 regarding safety.
– If we find out about a safety flaw that needs to be fixed we always act according to our protocols. There may be employees who think that the action was not exactly what they had wished for and there are also times when we cannot share detailed information about actions for integrity reasons, for example in HR issues.
We've now connected with Alex through Paul Connolly, the Norran English editor. Alex is currently at the Norran offices, recounting his experiences from his years at Northvolt. He has extensive professional experience but states he's never worked anywhere with so many safety breaches. The emphasis, he explains, was always on speed; production had to keep moving.
He describes explosive areas that were initially misclassified, and safety documents that went missing, only to be found long after machines were put into use. He's clearly upset, emphasizing that these aren't isolated errors but systematic failings in safety protocols. He suddenly pauses mid-sentence, takes a breath, and points an admonishing finger.
– You know the fatal accident, where a guy died in an explosion? It was exactly one of those areas.
He questions how Northvolt's top management allowed this to persist, and why customers didn't demand higher standards. Then again, he admits, the factory was always meticulously cleaned before customer visits, giving a sanitized impression. He describes a typical visit:
– It's always the same story. First, the alarm is rung: Audi is coming, BMW are on their way, in an hour Volkswagen will come to your building – make sure it’s presentable.
NMC, a very toxic matrial, was handeled openly in the Revolt premises.
Then the delegation arrives. They move slowly through the room, guided by managers who point out various things, and the delegation nods. Alex watches them approach and, as usual, they walk straight past without stopping to speak to the staff.
He wonders to himself what they would think about the toxic green pool that was on the floor here earlier, or the mountain of waste outside the lab. A single question might have shattered the illusion of how production was actually performing: "How is it going?" But he never hears anyone ask that question.
Waste is stored in the premises. Here they are in front of an emergency exit and a sign for fire extinguishers.
Soon, the delegation will disappear into a private room for a PowerPoint presentation. The managers will brief them on the process of extracting cathode material from spent batteries. No one, however, will mention what the facility is primarily churning out: waste, or at best, a material from which cathode material could eventually be extracted.
Emma Nehrenheim, Northvolt's chief environmental officer and head of Revolt, stated in June 2025 that Revolt Ett has delivered over 150 tonnes of nickel, cobalt, and manganese sulphates, along with 10 tonnes of battery-grade lithium hydroxide.
It's important to note, however, that sulphates are not pure metals, which Northvolt claims on its website to recycle. Instead, they are chemical compounds from which nickel, manganese, and cobalt will later be produced.
Alex wonders what's truly going on. He returns to the office where his colleague is working, still pondering the shares he's been offered. He turns to the colleague, who received the same offer.
– Are you going to buy? he asks.
The colleague shoots him a tired glance before resuming work.
– Never in a million years, he finally responds.
The colleague then brings up another large company that turned out to be a sham. Could Northvolt be that kind of sham, Alex wonders? No, he doesn't want to believe it.
On the other hand, he later considers, if it was never truly meant to work, it might explain some things about the factory. For instance, why managers seem intent on hiding the fact that equipment and work methods are failing. And why employees who point this out tend to vanish from the workplace after a while.
It could also explain why people with no relevant skills or experience are promoted, while those with extensive industry experience are ignored or bought out. After all, it's not just Revolt that has issues. Alex has worked in several buildings across the campus, and the story is consistent elsewhere.
Norran raported on concerns for the work environment in spring and summer of 2024. In this case it regarded cleaning.
Let's rewind a few months. In the spring and summer of 2024, Norran was actively reporting on work environment deficiencies and safety problems at Northvolt. Beyond the fatal accidents, three individuals had died under uncertain circumstances after finishing shifts at the factory. Cleaning staff were raising alarms about safety risks.
While prosecutors investigated the fatal accidents, suspicions surrounding the other deaths were dismissed. The summer of 2024 saw significant headlines, with even national media covering the factory's work environment.
During this same period, as Northvolt grappled intensely with its production issues, its public image began to crack.
The relentless reporting was stressing Peter Carlsson. Despite being far from their ultimate goals, production had at least increased significantly in a short time. However, their existing capital was dwindling rapidly, and the crucial 50 billion kronor loan had still not materialised.
They initiated another new share issue to inject more capital, but interest was notably low. One principal owner began to withdraw support, and the other quickly followed suit. The company then lost a major order worth 22 billion kronor, and the ongoing stories about accidents and deaths destabilised the situation even further.
– The extensive negative reports in the media made the investors nervous; they thought the risk was too high, Carlsson says in the present day.
Mikael Stenmark brought factory problems to the attention of Peter Carlsson.
The first weekend of his holiday in the summer of 2024, Mikael Stenmark, a senior safety representative, received a phone call from work. It was Peter Carlsson, who wanted to meet. When they did, Carlsson asked for advice on how to handle journalists' questions about the work environment and accidents.
Stenmark advised him to be humble and acknowledge that injuries could occur at Northvolt if protocols weren't followed, and to state that they were addressing these issues within their systematic work environment process.
– But Peter, I said, that’s a white lie. This isn't working. We are getting horrible reports from one area, horrible. It works when the safety team or safety representative is present, but when they leave, it’s terrible how people are treated, Stenmark says.
Carlsson, according to Stenmark, reacted to this, asking where the biggest challenges lay. Exactly what transpired next isn't known, but two days later, the manager of the problematic area was gone.
Peter Carlsson pulls the brake but it was probably too late.
While Alex, Josefin, and Mikael wrestled with a deficient work environment, and Ali and Maggie grappled with faulty machines, Carlsson and the management were fighting a losing battle to convince owners and investors to inject more money.
The situation was now truly dire, and Carlsson admitted to Dagens Industri in an interview over the summer that they were hitting the pause button. He stated they had "been too aggressive" and were now reviewing the timelines for their ambitious international expansion plans.
By early August, the American company Rothschild, initially tasked with preparing Northvolt's stock-exchange listing, instead had to explore possibilities for reconstruction. They also began negotiating the agreement with Scania to finance the American Chapter 11 process - the company's last resort to avoid bankruptcy.
Northvolt's management knew funds were about to run out. Yet, it would be another five weeks before they halted spending on travel and expenses. Contracts continued, and orders kept flowing, as evidenced by court documents from subcontractors. The only exception to the spending freeze applied to those working to boost production to 100,000 battery cells per week.
Thereafter, management decisions continued to roll in. About a week after the spending halt, 1,600 people in Skellefteå, Västerås, and Stockholm were given notice. Upstream operations were cancelled. Two weeks later, Northvolt filed for bankruptcy for its subsidiary Expansion Ett, and the factory's expansion was completely halted. The green loan consequently lapsed, as it had been intended for expansion, not for ongoing operations.
Shockwaves rippled through Skellefteå, and at Norran's offices, we were kept busy trying to keep track of every development. Why had there been no indications from Northvolt about the true severity of the situation? Where had all the money gone?, we wondered throughout the autumn.
There were many dark Northvolt headlines in October.
The annual report for 2023 shows a rapid increase in costs between 2022 and 2023, which is understandable as production ramped up during that period. We also observe that income levels remained modest. Simultaneously, interest costs climbed, and capital rapidly depleted.
We asked Jan Marton, a lecturer and researcher in accounting at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg, to review the annual report for us. His analysis indicates that both running costs and investments consumed the equity in 2023. He noted that the liquid assets -- money available for payments -- would, at that spending rate, have run out by November 2024. However, given Northvolt's growth, expenditures likely increased in 2024.
– So they are likely gone now, he explained to Norran in October 2024.
Northvolt faced a crisis the previous year, but the company resolved it with a 16 billion kronor loan.
According to Marton, it's not unusual for new companies to take a long time to become profitable. He cited Klarna, Voi, and Spotify as examples.
– It is not entirely unusual that companies are financed by investors for a long time, for example development companies within medicine, that develop new pharmaceuticals. It could be a process of up to 10 years before a new medical product is approved. During that time investors must constantly inject new money.
However, Marton points out that Northvolt differs from many new companies in two key ways: it involves much larger sums of money, and its operations have been financed largely through loans. These loans accrue interest and must be repaid unless they are convertible debenture loans that are converted. This repayment consumes equity as long as income remains too low.
Throughout the autumn, both Ali and Maggie quit. Allen had left long ago, Johan resigned the year before, and Oscar moved back home. Landon left Northvolt in 2022 and returned to the US to work on his own start-up, Peak Energy. Alex resigned in the autumn. Mikael Stenmark, the senior safety representative, remained until the bankruptcy in March 2025.
The American Chapter 11 reconstruction process failed, and the money borrowed from Scania ran out. At the same time, the production of the truck manufacturer's batteries had gained momentum, and the production capacity was, according to Northvolt, better than ever. Towards Christmas, things looked brighter for a while. A possible solution seemed within reach after the New Year. It was still far from secure, but Carlsson held onto hope.
– We had great faith in being able to get out of the reconstruction with a new arrangement, he says.
Peter Carlsson becomes emotional when he remembers being told that the money had run out.
But one day towards the end of February Northvolt’s chairman of the board, Tom Johnstone phones Carlsson up. The money is gone and hope is out.
– A key party had dropped out. I realised then it was over. I became completely cold and empty. It was a terrible feeling. If we had got a little bit more time I’m fairly convinced that we would have solved it, but the money ran out.
Northvolt's former MD Peter Carlsson got many questions during the press conference where the company announced its bankruptcy.
At the press conference on March 12, 2025, Northvolt's chairman of the board, Tom Johnstone, took the lead.
Behind him, Carlsson, dressed in a grey suit, appeared barely able to hold himself together.
An SVT reporter posed the question of what it felt like to be "one of the few to make money out of Northvolt."
"An incredibly stupid question," Carlsson retorted, then stormed out.
– I know what it would look like, and it was a stupid thing to say. But in a situation where so much hard work done by so many people comes to nothing... I thought it was such... a wrong question at that time, he says.
Back at the office, it's time to summarise what we've uncovered. We've spoken to numerous individuals -- more than can be included in this story. We've sifted through vast amounts of articles and government documents. We've drawn timelines, debated back and forth.
Finally, we also had the opportunity to speak with Peter Carlsson, chose to give his version of the years at Northvolt. . But have we truly become any wiser? Can we definitively say why Northvolt fell apart? Yes. They were unable to produce the green battery they had promised. But why?
Robin Zheng, MD of the world's largest battery manufacturer CATL, was asked in an interview about the failures of European battery manufacturers.
– They have the wrong design, a faulty process and the wrong equipment, he said.
That partly aligns with our findings. Northvolt clearly had the wrong equipment, given all the problems. There have also been issues with dysfunctional processes, impure material, clogged pipes, and poorly planned buildings.
Management, it's evident, also made some questionable decisions, such as bringing in untested machines and taking on too many projects. They expanded rapidly and applied the brakes too late. Simultaneously, demands from both customers and investors limited the company's ability to make certain decisions differently.
There have been internal conflicts between employees on the factory floor and middle managers. Information seems to have gotten stuck between the top and the production floor. Employees also testify that it took a long time to solve problems, leading to frustration and production interruptions. We haven't received a clear answer whether this was due to insecurity, a lack of skills, or unclear mandates, but many bear witness to a culture where internal systems for error reporting and whistle-blowing yielded no visible changes.
Some have called Northvolt an experimental workshop, or -- as the engineer Oscar put it -- a university lab where everyone can fail countless times. Perhaps the clash of different nationalities' experiences with varying hierarchical systems collided with the flat Swedish model, where your boss is your friend, and it's acceptable to make mistakes?
At the same time, Northvolt operated on a fundamentally different financing model than the currently successful battery factories. In Sweden, there are no large state subsidies to capitalise on. Those who wish to start an industry here can secure some grants, but the significant capital is expected to come from venture capital and loans. When the financiers are no longer willing to pay, it's over.
Norran's reporter Anna Wikner tries to summarise what went wrong at Northvolt. It is a complex puzzle.
Perhaps one individual who struggled to get the pilot line at Northvolt Labs working best summarises the situation, suggesting that despite Northvolt's errors, they also operated under unequal conditions.
– In China, they work 12-hour shifts, six days a week. As a society, we have to realize that we are competing with a culture that does that. I worry about my children's future. China has a political and cultural system I do not want them to live under, but if they win the economic fight, I think there’s a big risk they will.
They become emotional when contemplating the future, speaking at length about the critical importance of Europe and North America keeping pace with Asia in batteries, semiconductors, and AI.
– We are losing our advantage regarding two of them, and with the third, we are so far behind. It's frightening. I don’t think we can underestimate how big of a thing it was that China had made capital so cheap for their battery manufacturers for so long – the capital structure is like a war economy. If Northvolt had that possibility, the company would still remain. Much bigger mistakes were made by the Chinese battery industry in the beginning than what Northvolt did. But the system was forgiving. So we have to find a way of doing this our way. How do we compete?
Investigation
With the help of around 20 well-informed sources — several of whom requested anonymity due to concerns about future job prospects — and access to extensive documentation, a clearer picture is emerging of what really happened at the Skellefteå factory. We have conducted in-depth interviews with many of these sources and remained in regular contact with them. The information published in this series has been verified by multiple individuals and reveals patterns we have tried to illustrate.
As part of our reporting, we also contacted several former senior managers at Northvolt Ett for comment. Plant manager Fredrik Hedlund declined to participate. Plant manager Mark Duchesne did not respond to our request. We sent questions to Maria Åstrand, head of Upstream, but have not received a reply. Emma Nehrenheim, head of Revolt and environmental affairs, has answered some of our questions, although others remain unanswered.
In many cases, it would have been preferable to hear directly from those who have worked at the heart of the company.